- •§1. Place op contract in jurisprudence. 3
- •§ 2. Obligation.
- •§2. Place of contract in jurisprudence. 5
- •§2. Place of contract in jurisprudence. 9
- •§ 2. Acceptance must he absolute, and identical ivith the terms
- •§ I. Agreement,
- •§ 3. II proposal which has not been accepted does not affect the Till accept-
- •§ 5. It proposal may lapse otherwise tJian by revocation as
- •§ 6. Proposal and Acceptance need not necessarily he written Contracts
- •§ 7. A proposal need not be made to an ascertained person,
- •§ I. Contracts of Record.
- •§ 2, Contract under Seal,
- •§ 3. Simple Contracts required to be in writing.
- •§ 4. ConsideItATiaN.
- •§ I. Political or Professional Status,
- •§ 2. Infants,
- •§ 3. Married women.
- •§ 4. Corporations.
- •§ 5. Lunatic and drunken persons.
- •§ 2. MlSbepbesentation.
- •§ 3. Fraud.
- •§ 4. Duress.
- •§ 5. UamuE Influence.
- •§ I. Nature of Illegality m Contract.
- •§ 18 Upon Stock ExchiEknge transactions is well summarised in the
- •§ 2. Effect of Illeoalitt upon Contracts in
- •§ I. Assignment by act of the parties.
- •§ 2. Assignment of contractual rights and liabilities by
- •§ I. Froof of Document,
- •§ 2. Evidence as to /act cf Agreement.
- •§ 3. Evidence as to the terms of the Contract,
- •§ I. General Rales,
- •§ 2. Rvlea 0/ Law and Equity as to Time and Penalties,
- •§ I. Waiver.
- •§ 2. Svhstituted Contract
- •§ 3. Provisions for DischcMrge,
- •§ 1. Position op pabties whebe a Contbact
- •§ 2. Forms of Discharge bt Breach.
- •§ 3. Eemedies fob breach of Contract.
- •§ 4. DiSghaboe of RiOht of AcTion abisiNa
§ I. General Rales,
So far we bave dealt with the admissibility of evidence in
relation to contracts in writing. We now come to deal with
the rules of construction which govern the interpretation of
the contract as it is found to bave been made between the
parties.
(i) The first rule to lay down is that words ,are to be (1) Words
understood in their plain and literal meaning. And this rule stood^n^^'^
is followed even though its consequences may not have been ^^^^^ p^^*"
, , , meaning.
in the contemplation of the parties, subject always to admis-
sible evidence being adduced of a usage varying the usual
meaning of the words, and subject to the next rule which we
proceed to state.
(2) 'An agreement ought to receive that construction Maiianr. May.
which will best effectuate the intention of the parties to be
collected /rom the whole of the agreement ;* 'Greater regard Ford v. Beech,
is to be had to the clear intention of the parties than to any
particular words which they may have used in the expression
of their intent'
These two rules would seem sometimes to be in conflict, (2) Subject
but they come substantially to this; men will be taken to ^f ij^^ention
have meant precisely what they have said, unless, from the ^^J™ ^^
whole tenor of the instrument, a definite meaning can be ment.
collected which gives a broader interpretation to specific
words than their literal meaning would bear. The Courts
B
249
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT.
Part IV.
General
purport of
rules of
construc-
tion.
will not make an agreement for the parties, but will ascer-
tain what their agreement was, if not by its general purport,
then by the literal meaning of its words. Subsidiary to
these main rules there are various others, all tending to the
same end, the effecting of the intention of the parties so far
as it can be discerned.
Thus Courts, both of Law and Equity, will correct obvious
mistakes in writing and grammar.
They will restrain the meaning of general words by more
specific and particular descriptions of the subject-matter to
which they are to apply.
They assign to words susceptible of two meanings that
in A. & E. 326. which will make the instrument valid. Thus in Haigh v,
Brooksy a document was expressed to be given to the
plaintiffs * in consideration of your heir^ in advance ' to J. S.
It was argued that this showed a past consideration, but the
Court held that the words might mean a prospective advance,
and be equivalent to ' in consideration of your becoming in
advance,' or * on condition of your being in advance.'
They will construe words most strongly against the party
who used them. The principle on which this rule is based
seems to be that a man is responsible for ambiguities in his
own expression, and has no right to induce another to con-
tract with him on the supposition that his words mean one
thing while he hopes the Court will adopt a construction
by which they would mean another thing, more to his
advantage.
Fowkes V.
Manchester
Assurance
AssociatioOt
3 B. 81 S.
at p. 929.